The Truth Will Not Set You Free in Nebraska: Actual Malice and Nebraska\u27s  Truth Plus Motive  Defense by Powell, Thomas Edward, II
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 4 Article 10
1993
The Truth Will Not Set You Free in Nebraska:
Actual Malice and Nebraska's "Truth Plus Motive"
Defense
Thomas Edward Powell II
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Edward Powell II, The Truth Will Not Set You Free in Nebraska: Actual Malice and Nebraska's "Truth Plus Motive" Defense, 72
Neb. L. Rev. (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol72/iss4/10
Comment
Thomas Edward Powell, II
The Truth Will Not Set You Free in
Nebraska: Actual Malice and
Nebraska's "Truth Plus Motive"
Defense*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................ 1236
II. New York Times Company v. Sullivan and its Progeny-
their Effect on the "Truth Plus Motive" Defense .......... 1238
A. Common Law Defamation Prior to New York Times.. 1238
B. New York Times Company v. Sullivan-Constitutional
M alice Established ..................................... 1239
1. Constitutional Malice Distinguished ................ 1241
2. Garrison v. State of Louisiana-"Truth Plus
Motive" Addressed ................................. 1243
3. Defamation After New York Times and Garrison.. 1245
4. New York Times and Garrison Interpreted ........ 1246
III. Actual Malice in Nebraska Law ........................... 1248
A. Statutory Interpretation ............................... 1248
B. Nebraska Case Law .................................... 1249
IV. Constitutionality of a "Truth Plus Motive" Defense ....... 1257
A. Inhibitory Effects and Self-Censorship ................. 1258
B. Infringement on the Right of Self-Government ........ 1265
V. The "Truth Plus Motive Defense" in Other Jurisdictions . 1269
VI. Conclusion ................................................. 1274
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost every journalist will tell you that a reporter or publisher
will be protected if what he writes, prints or broadcasts is true. How-
ever, truth is not the absolute talisman to defamation actions that it is
widely believed to be. A majority of states accept truth as a complete
defense to civil defamation actions; however, a few states require a
* Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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defendant in a defamation action to prove more than the truth in or-
der to be protected from liability.1 Nebraska is such a state, requiring
a defamation defendant to show not only the truth of the allegedly
defamatory statement but also that he published the stories with good
motives and for justifiable ends-a "truth plus motive" defense.2
This "truth plus motive" requirement can be found in the Ne-
braska Constitution. Article I, § 5 of Nebraska's Bill of Rights pro-
vides, "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all tri-
als for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with
good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense."3
A similar limitation on truth as a defense is also codified in Nebraska
statutes. Nebraska statute § 25-840 provides, "In the actions men-
tioned in Section 25-839 [libel and slander], the defendant may allege
the truth of the matter charged as defamatory.... The truth in itself
and alone shall be a complete defense unless it shall be proved by the
plaintiff that the publication was made with actual malice."4 Ne-
braska courts have adopted the common law definition of malice,
"hate, spite or ill will,"5 and the unconstitutionality of Nebraska's de-
fense to libel hinges on this definition of actual malice. The Nebraska
Supreme Court's historical application of § 25-840 and its specific in-
terpretation of actual malice as common law malice have created a
total bar to the "truth alone" defense and established the good motives
requirement as an element of the truth defense in defamation actions.
Consequently, in Nebraska, true statements are protected from a defa-
mation action only if the publisher wrote or spoke without ill will,
hate or spite.
This "truth plus motive" standard appears decent and noble. It
1. Those states in addition to Nebraska that have a statutes or constitutional provi-
sions codifying the "truth plus motive" defense are: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 10, § 3919 (West 1990); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1991); Illinois, ILL.
CONsT. art. I, § 4 (1993); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 231, § 92
(1985); Nevada, NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (1991); North Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 4 (1981); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8342 (1982) and Pa. Const.
art. 1, § 7 (1990); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-6-9 (1990); South Dakota, S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1991); West Virginia, W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 8 (1989); Wyo-
ming, WYo. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1990). In addition to those states discussed infra
at notes 170-178, West Virginia and Wyoming courts have recently held the "truth
plus motive" defense to be unconstitutional in light of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. See Dixon v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 237 (W.Va. 1992), cert
denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 325, 122 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc.,
839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992).
2. The labelling of Nebraska's interpretation of the truth defense as "truth-plus-
motive" is found in Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality ofLimi-
tations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789, 790 (1964).
3. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5.
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-840 (Cure. Supp. 1992).
5. Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 290, 411 N.W.2d 298, 309 (1987).
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also appears morally and intellectually satisfying in that a person's
reputation should not be harmed, even by the truth, if the speaker is
not motivated by honorable causes. 6 The Supreme Court, however,
has not adopted this rationale. Rather,it has specifically declared the
"truth plus motive" standard unconstitutional and "overborne by the
larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemina-
tion of truth."7
This comment will present the relevant federal and Nebraska case
law regarding the truth defense, demonstrating that Nebraska's cur-
rent interpretation of the "truth plus good motives" defense to libel
actions is unconstitutional. Specifically, this comment will examine
the Nebraska court's definition of "actual malice" as it relates to pub-
lic officials and demonstrate that this definition causes § 25-840 to be
unconstitutional.
II. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY v. SULLIVAN AND ITS
PROGENY-THEIR EFFECT ON THE "TRUTH PLUS
MOTIVE" DEFENSE
A. Common Law Defamation Prior to New York Times
Prior to the significant changes in the law of defamation worked by
the United States Supreme Court beginning in 19648, the media's abil-
ity to comment or report on public figures was substantially limited to
true statements of fact and limited expressions of opinion.9 Five ele-
ments were generally necessary to establish libel at common law:
1) Defamatory words, either fact or opinion, relating to the
plaintiff;
2) Falsity of fact or lack of factual justification for opinion;
3) Publication to third parties;
4) Malice, i.e., ill will or hostility, actual or implied; and
5) Injury.lO
Under the above formulation, the publisher of the statement was lia-
ble for deliberate lies, negligent falsehoods, and, in a minority of
states, true statements made with ill-will. The plaintiff had to prove
6. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964); Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834,
838, 118 NW 1071, 1072 (1908); Franklin, supra note 2 at 806-07.
7. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
8. 1964 is significant because the Supreme Court began its re-ordering of defamation
laws with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in that year. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 17-29.
9. See FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., 2 THE LAW OF TORTs 5.0 (2d ed. 1986).
10. John B. McRory & Robert C. Bernius, Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law, in
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES NUMBER 346, COMMuNIcATIoNs LAW 1991 89, 95-96 (1991).
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that the defendant published" the statement and that the statement
was defamatory. The defendant was held liable unless he could prove
the truth of the statement or that the statement was made on a privi-
leged occasion.1 2
At common law a successful defense of truth required the pub-
lisher to prove the truth of the entire statement; consequently, the
defendant was strictly liable for any statement he made. Proof that
the statement was only partially true was not sufficient to support the
defense.' 3 If the statement was false the defendant was liable. The
defendant's state of mind regarding the truth or falsity of the state-
ment was irrelevant, no matter how honest or reasonable the defend-
ant's belief in the truth of an ultimately false statement.14 Truth was
an absolute defense to a libelous statement in many states; however, in
a minority of jurisdictions, the plaintiff was allowed to overcome the
truth defense by a showing that the defendant published the state-
ment with actual malice i.e. spite, hostility or ill-will.
For nearly the first two centuries of our history, the creation and
interpretation of defamation law was left to the states. Each state de-
veloped varying standards of proof of defamation, paying little heed to
the effect the law had on the news media or free speech. In this tan-
gle, the "truth plus motive" defense became accepted by a number of
states. 5 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court first entered the
morass of state libel law in an effort to impose a national standard of
proof in the defamation arena. Their first move in this effort began
with the landmark case, New York Times Company v. Sullivan.'6 As
the genesis of constitutional malice, the New York Times decision
must be considered in an assessment of the "truth plus motive"
defense.
B. New York Times Company v. Sullivan-Constitutional Malice
Established
The New York Times case arose in the turbulent and politically
heated civil rights struggle of the early 1960's. On March 29, 1960, a
full page advertisement, critical of the Alabama and Montgomery gov-
ernments' actions in various civil rights demonstrations, ran in the
New York Times. The advertisement was endorsed by over sixty
11. "Published" not only refers to physical publication in the print media but also
oral dissemination. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed. 1991).
12. Common law privileges are of two types-conditional and absolute. The absolute
privileges are: 1) judicial proceedings, 2) legislative, administrative, and executive
proceedings, 3) publication of reports of public proceedings and meetings.
HARPER, ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 5.21-.27 at 177-231.
13. I& at § 5.20 at 166-67.
14. Id.
15. See supra note 1.
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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prominent performers, politicians, and religious figures.17 L.B. Sulli-
van, one of three elected city commissioners in Montgomery, sued the
New York Times for libel, alleging that, as commissioner of public af-
fairs whose duties included the supervision of the police department,
he had been injured by the advertisement. Sullivan was not specifi-
cally named anywhere in the advertisement and a reader would be
hard pressed to see how the advertisement referred to him.1 8 Sullivan
also named as defendants four local, black ministers whose names had
been included in the advertisement without their knowledge.
The trial lasted three days in a strongly racially prejudiced court-
room.19 After only two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a ver-
dict of $500,000 against the New York Times and the four ministers. 20
The Alabama Supreme Court sustained the trial court in all rulings,
after which the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.21
Justice William Brennan authored the opinion of the Court in New
York Times,22 focusing on the need to fashion liability rules which did
not inhibit the free exercise of public criticism. Brennan noted that
under the traditional common law rules, a speaker was required to
guarantee the truth of all his factual statements. 23 The penalty under
common law for even an unintentional false statements was virtually
unlimited libel judgements, a result which ultimately led to self-cen-
sorship.24 Such a result was unacceptable given the compelling need
for an unfettered and vocal news media in the structure of our govern-
ment. Justice Brennan also reasoned that the defense of truth, with
the burden of proof placed on the defendant, not only deters false
17. Among those signing the advertisement were Marlon Brando, Nat "King" Cole,
Sammy Davis, Jr., Mahalia Jackson, Sydney Portier, Jackie Robinson, Eleanor
Roosevelt, Maureen Stapleton, and Shelly Winters. RICHARD LABUNsKI, LIBEL
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT AND
BROADCASTING, 105 n. 3 (1987).
18. Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sulli-
van and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339, 344 (1990). Hall's article offers an
excellent account of the social and political forces that motivated the New York
Times decision. See also ANTHONY LEWIs, MAKE No LAw-THE SULLIVAN CASE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
19. The four ministers used the tainted atmosphere as a basis for their appeal to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 354.
20. CLIFTON 0. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFF us-THE EVOLVING
LAW OF LIBEL 216 (1971). This was the largest judgement, defamation or other-
wise, in Alabama history. Hall, supra note 18, at 355. The trial judge rejected the
defendants' motions for new trial based on the excessive amount of the judge-
ment. Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court denied any appeals.
21. Labunski, supra note 17 at 74. This was the first time the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to a state libel judgement. Lawhorne, supra note 20 at 216.
22. Justices Black and Goldberg issued concurring opinions which Justice Douglas
joined. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-305 (1964).
23. See supra text following notes 8-15.
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
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speech but also truthful speech. It was often difficult to produce abso-
lute proof that a statement was true in all its factual particulars.25
Consequently,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of
the unlawful zone."2 6
Therefore, the common law defamation standards caused an unneces-
sary and dangerous timidity in the press that, "dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate."27 Recognizing the inevitable na-
ture of inadvertent falsehoods and unintentional missteps, the Court
set out to remove the chill caused by common law defamation.
In doing this the Court in essence, found the defense of truth alone
to be inadequate to protect speech and promote public debate. As a
result, the Supreme Court developed a new standard of proof for pub-
lications concerning the official conduct of a public official which did
not rely on the absolute truth of the statement as a defense. The
Court stated,
the constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice"--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.2 8
In this one sentence the Court worked a revolution in common law
defamation. In a single stroke they removed the strict liability of the
common law, replacing it with a relatively high standard of proof,
even higher than negligence. After New York Times, a defendant in a
defamation action has a constitutional guarantee that if the statements
he makes regarding a public official are true or if he has a reasonable
and justifiable belief in the truth of the statement, he will be insulated
from civil liability.
1. Constitutional Malice Distinguished
Prior to New York Times, actual malice in the legal lexicon meant
hate, spite or ill will. This standard, known now as common law mal-
ice, addressed the publisher's attitude toward the individual. New
York Times defined constitutional malice to be the knowledge that a
statement was false or a reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the statement. After New York Times, actual malice was completely
redefined and refocused to address not the publisher's attitude toward
25. Id. (citing Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (6th Cir. 1893)).
26. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
27. Id. at 279.
28. Id. at 279-80.
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the individual but rather the publisher's attitude toward the veracity
of the statement.
By redefining the term "actual malice" as knowledge that a state-
ment was false or was made with reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity, New York Times placed common law malice in serious ques-
tion constitutionally. This redefining has caused no small amount of
confusion in the lower courts, as the cases decided soon after New
York Times implementing this new standard indicate.29 The Court re-
cently attempted to clarify the distinction between common law mal-
ice and constitutional actual malice in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.30 In Masson, the Court stated,
actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused
with the concept of malice as an evil intent or motive arising from spite or ill
will .... In place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury in-
structions refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.3 1
This clarification does make the distinction between the two forms of
malice more evident; however, this holding does not overrule the
strong line of decisions following New York Times that specifically
held a "truth plus motive" standard to be an "error of constitutional
magnitude."3 2
The Court's ultimate refutation of the common law malice does not
affect the application and utility of common law malice in the determi-
nation of potential punitive damages or the existence of constitutional
malice. Many states that do not subscribe to the "truth plus motive"
defense require a showing of common law malice in order to award
punitive damages. 33 Common law malice may also be probative of
whether the publisher made the statement with the degree of negli-
gence required to prove constitutional malice. 34 However, common
29. See infra text following note 44-61.
30. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). See also, 1 SLADE R. METCALF & LEONARD M. NEHOFF,
RIGHTs AND LIABILFTIEs OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS, § 1.67
(1992).
31. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2429-30.
32. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970).
33. Reynolds Metal Co. V. Mays, 547 So.2d 518 (Ala. 1989); Burnett v. National En-
quirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Peoples v. Guthrie, 404 S.E.2d
442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65 (Me. 1991); Stresen-Reuter
v. Hull, 1990 WL 109877 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Hamilton v. Petroleum Co., 769
P.2d 146 (Okla. 1989); DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 544 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); Ryan v. Herald Assoc. Inc., 566 A.2d 1316 (Vt. 1989); Dworkin v. L.F.P.,
Inc., 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992).
34. Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161 (Me. 1983). See also, METCALF
& NEIHOFF, supra note 30, at § 1.67. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly in-
structed and reminded lower courts that actual malice in the constitutional sense
is markedly different from actual malice in the common law sense. The former
standard, which herein is being characterized as constitutional malice, focuses
'on the conduct and state of mind' of the media defendant at the time of publica-
1242 [Vol. 72:1236
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law malice alone is not sufficient to prove constitutional malice.3 5 One
court stated, "[w]hile 'ill will' is not an element of the legal definition
of 'actual malice'.., it is nevertheless relevant and admissible as evi-
dence in the determination of whether defendant possessed a state of
mind highly conducive to reckless disregard of falsity."36
2. Garrison v. State of Louisiana-"Truth Plus Motive"
Addressed
The United States Supreme Court in Garrison v. State of Louisi-
ana37 had the opportunity to interpret and implement the new consti-
tutional malice standard only eight months after New York Times was
decided. Its decision in Garrison sent a clear message that the "truth
plus motive" defense was unconstitutional.
Garrison dealt with an appeal from a criminal libel conviction.
The district attorney of Orleans Parish, Jim Garrison, was engaged in
war of words with eight judges of the state district court over operat-
ing expenses for the vice division of the district attorney's office.38
During a press conference, Garrison accused the judges of being ineffi-
cient, lazy and susceptible to the influence of racketeers. 39 Garrison
was tried and convicted of criminal defamation under the Louisiana
criminal defamation statute.4 0 The conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana,41 but the United States Supreme Court
reversed.
The Garrison opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, applied the
reasoning of New York Times, a civil libel suit, to a criminal libel pros-
tion, in particular, the defendant's awareness of the truth or falsity of the matter
published. This constitutional standard can also be referred to as scienter...
Common law malice, on the other hand, focuses on the defendant's attitude to-
ward the plaintiff. This term refers to a feeling of ill-will, spite, hostility, or de-
liberate intent to harm." Id.
35. W. WAT HopKiNs, AcTuAL MALICE-25 YEARS AFrER Times v. Sullivan 150-52
(1989).
36. Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1220 (Ind. 1978). The court
reasoned that a determination of the New York Times standard was not a clear
cut, bright line formula. The court stated, "Appellant's estimate of the
probability of falsity of its publications was not derived with mathematical exact-
ness from purely objective factors. It was certainly influenced by various consid-
erations one of which might very well have been appellants hatred for appellee.
Ill will evidence might also tend to prove that appellant published in spite of its
estimate of a probability of falsity." Id. See also Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431,
434 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
37. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
38. The district attorney in this case was Jim Garrison, the only prosecutor to bring
an action in the John Kennedy assassination. Garrison's efforts were recently
depicted in Oliver Stone's movie JFK.
39. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 66 (1964).
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (West 1950).
41. State v. Garrison, 154 So.2d 400 (La. 1963).
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ecution. The Court held that a public official would be allowed a crim-
inal remedy only if he established that the statement was made with
constitutional malice. Paralleling the reasoning in New York Times
and highlighting the importance of robust and wide open public de-
bate, Justice Brennan stated,
debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the
risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did
speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free in-
terchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. Under a rule like the Loui-
siana rule, permitting a finding of malice based on an intent merely to inflict
harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm through falsehood, "it becomes a
hazardous matter to speak out against a popular politician."4 2
It follows from this opinion that a "truth plus motives" defense will
not stand up to constitutional scrutiny where the discussion of public
affairs is concerned.
Fear of being forced to prove motive had and continues to have the
same chilling effect that strict liability had for the statements consid-
ered in New York Times. Consequently, the "truth plus motive" de-
fense must fall in front of the superior interests of an unfettered press.
The Court sent an unequivocal message that true statements were ab-
solutely protected regardless of motive; only when a speaker makes
false statements or makes a statement with a high degree of aware-
ness of its probable falsity, may a statement regarding a public official
be the subject of civil or criminal sanctions.43
As a result of the Garrison and New York Times decisions and the
protections established therein, any requirement such as Nebraska's
that the defendant prove that he published the statement without ill-
will violates the First Amendment. The First Amendment violation
occurs because the true statement motivated by ill-will is still a true
statement that contributes to the marketplace of ideas. It obviously is
not false nor is it made with a high degree of awareness of its probable
falsity.
The Court's decision directly undermined the "truth plus motive"
defense when it pointedly stated, "[flor, contrary to the New York
Times rule, which absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful criti-
cism, the statute directs punishment for true statements made with
'actual malice.' And 'actual malice' is defined... below to mean 'ha-
tred, ill will or enmity or a wanton desire to injure.' "44 It reasonably
follows then that truthful speech is absolutely protected, and any pun-
ishment of truthful criticism of the official activity of public officials is
absolutely prohibited.
42. Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,73 (1964)(quoting Noel, Defamation of
Public Offrzwers and Candidates, 49 COL. L. REV. 875, 893 (1949).)
43. Id. at 74.
44. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
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3. Defamation After New York Times and Garrison
Through these two decisions, the United States Supreme Court
radically changed the law of defamation, established constitutional
standards for defamation law, and altered the list of elements neces-
sary to establish a defamation cause of action. The five elements now
required to establish a constitutional defamation action under consti-
tutional principles are:
1) A defamatory statement of fact relating to the plaintiff;
2) falsity of fact;
3) publication to third parties;
4) fault (knowledge that the statement was false or reckless dis-
regard for its truth or falsity); and
5) injury.45
The new fault standard developed by the United States Supreme
Court which is specifically applied to public officials and figures, is
found in § 580A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section
reads,
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a public
official or public figure in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that capacity
is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other person, or
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters.4 6
The truth defense is also presented in the Restatement § 581A which
states, "one who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not sub-
ject to liability for defamation if the statement is true."47 Common
law malice, defined as ill-will or improper motive, is no longer a per-
missible element of defamation. 48 The publisher must still make the
statement with the requisite degree of fault in order for there to be
defamation, but the focus of the fault inquiry is placed on the attitude
of the defendant toward the statement's veracity rather than on the
defendant's attitude toward the subject of the statement.
45. McCrory & Bernius, supra note 10, at 101-02.
46. RESTATEMTL (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1989).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1989).
48. Comment a states,
To create liability for defamation there must be publication of matter
that is both defamatory and false. There can be no recovery in defama-
tion for a statement of fact that is true, although the statement is made
for no good purpose and is inspired by ill will toward the person about
whom it is published and is made solely for the purpose of harming him.
Several states have constitutional or statutory provisions to the effect
that truth of a defamatory statement of fact is not a defense if the state-
ment is published for 'malicious motives' or if it is not published for 'jus-
tifiable ends' or on a matter of public concern. There have been rulings
that a provision of this type is unconstitutional, because it is in violation
of the First Amendment requirements of freedom of speech and of the
press, and its validity is very dubious."(emphasis added)
1245
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4. New York Times and Garrison Interpreted
Despite Brennan's seemingly unequivocal language in New York
Times and Garrison, lower federal courts and state courts could not
seem to implement the new defamation rules. Thus, only a few
months after Garrison was decided, the Court was required to clarify
that case's holding in Henry v. Collins.49 This civil libel suit arose out
of a civil rights leader's statements alleging that his arrest was part of
a "diabolical plot" in which the plaintiffs participated.5 0 The Court
determined that the trial court's jury instruction misapplied the New
York Times and Garrison holdings. The erroneous instruction read,
"[t]he court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that malice does not
necessarily mean hatred or ill will, but that malice may consist merely
of culpable recklessness or a wilful and wanton disregard of rights and
interests of the person defamed."51 The Court noted that these in-
structions might well have been wrongly understood by the jury to
allow recovery "on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than
intent to inflict harm through falsehood."52 The trial court's instruc-
tion did not require the jury to find common law malice; rather the
instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to consider the speaker's
motive. The Court's decision required that any reference to the
speaker's motive be expunged from the instruction so as to entirely
remove common law malice from the jury's deliberations. This excis-
ing of any mention of common law malice indicated the Court's intent
to remove motive from the realm of defamation law except in situa-
tions where motive may be relative to proof of constitutional malice.53
The Court again clarified the distinction between constitutional
malice and common law malice in Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks.M During the trial, the judge had instructed the jury that it
could find for the plaintiff if the defendant's newspaper had published
the allegedly libelous stories with "bad or corrupt motive."55 The
Court was unable to rule on the error of these instructions because the
defendant had not objected to them during the trial. Nonetheless, the
Court, in dicta, noted that an instruction such as the one given allowed
a finding of libel based on common law malice and, consequently, was
"clearly impermissible" and an "erroneous interpretation of New York
Times."56 The Court ultimately reversed a $5,000 verdict in favor of
49. 380 U.S. 356 (1965). The opinion is generally very short and extremely short for a
Supreme Court opinion-only 1 1/2 pages long.
50. MFTCALF & NEIHOFF, supra note 30, at § 1.22.
51. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 33-36.
54. 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
55. Id. at 82.
56. Id. The Court also stated that the defendant had offered inadequate instructions.
IM
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the elected clerk of the circuit court, basing its decision on the absence
of sufficient proof of constitutional malice in the record.
In May of 1970, the Supreme Court revisited the distinction be-
tween constitutional malice and common law malice in Greenbelt Co-
operative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler.57 In Greenbelt, a prominent
real estate developer, Bresler, was negotiating with the city of Green-
belt, Maryland for a zoning variance to build a housing complex. The
city also wanted to purchase land that Bresler owned in order to build
a new high school. Several city council meetings were held to discuss
the issues presented by these land deals. In the course of the public
debate local newspapers characterized Bresler's negotiating position
as "blackmail".58 As a result, Bresler brought a civil libel action based
on these stories.
The trial judge instructed the jury that it could find liability if the
articles had been published "with malice or with a reckless disregard
of whether they were true or false."59 The judge further defined
"malice" to mean spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm.60
Consequently, the Court noted that, "the jury was permitted to find
liability merely on the basis of a combination of falsehood and general
hostility."61 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.62 The Court began
its discussion by characterizing the jury instructions as an "error of
constitutional magnitude." 63 It viewed these instructions alone, char-
acterizing malice in the traditional common law sense, as enough to
reverse the judgement.
The Court's most recent statement regarding the constitutional na-
ture of the defense of truth came in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.64
The Court stated that, at least in media cases, "a statement on matters
of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liabil-
ity under state defamation law."65 The Court once again indicated
that a true statement may not be the subject of a defamation action.
Throughout the decisions discussed above, the Supreme Court has
indicated that at least in libel actions involving the criticisms of public
officials in their official capacity, truth, without any limitations or
qualifications, is a complete defense. 66 The "truth plus motive" de-
57. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id at 9.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 10.
64. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
65. Id. at 11.
66. All of the defendants in the cases previously discussed arguably would fall into
the category of "public official" or "public figure" under the current tests. The
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fense required in Nebraska and other states is in direct contradiction
to these holdings. Although the New York Times opinion did not di-
rectly address the "truth plus motive" defense, it laid the foundation
for its demise by redefining "actual malice" and by placing importance
on a free and uninhibited public debate. The Court in Garrison di-
rectly declared the "truth plus motive" defense to be unconstitutional
in either a civil or criminal case. In the Henry, Beckley, and Greenbelt
decisions, the Court reiterated the distinction between constitutional
and common law malice and restated Garrison's declaration of the de-
fense's impermissibility. These decisions indicate the unequivocal na-
ture of the Court's determination that truth alone is a sufficient
defense to a libel action and that common law malice, as embodied in
the "truth plus motive" defense, is not valid at least where public af-
fairs or officials are involved. Since the Milkovich decision, the Court
has not had occasion to comment on the "truth plus motive" defense.
This may be because these opinions clearly indicate this defense can-
not withstand constitutional scrutiny and, thus, no further clarifica-
tion is needed.
III. ACTUAL MALICE IN NEBRASKA LAW
A. Statutory Interpretation
Nebraska statute § 25-840 appears to be a straightforward state-
ment of the generally accepted rule that truth is a complete defense to
libel. The requirement of "actual malice" appears in the statute's pro-
vision, "the defendant may allege the truth of the matter charged as
defamatory.... The truth in itself and alone shall be a complete de-
fense unless it shall be proved by the plaintiff that the publication was
made with actual malice."6 7
On first consideration the statute is unexceptional, but on second
consideration the constitutional malice standard, if that is in fact what
is intended, appears in a situation that makes little sense. If actual
malice is understood to mean constitutional malice then the statute
would read "The truth in itself and alone shall be a complete defense
unless it shall be proved ... that the publication was made withfalsity
or with a reckless disregard as to it veracity." This makes no sense or
it is at least a restatement of the obvious. Consequently, the legisla-
ture's inclusion of actual malice in a statute establishing the truth de-
Supreme Court has limited these holdings to public figure defamation cases. In
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975), the Court acknowledged
that it had "carefully left open the question of whether the First or Fourteenth
Amendment require that the truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation
action brought by a private person as distinguished from a public official or public
figure." See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
67. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-840 (Reissue 1989 & Cune. Supp. 1992).
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fense is misplaced. Actual malice requirements belong in the statute
that establishes the elements of the tort. The presence of actual mal-
ice in this statute can only indicate that the legislature intended com-
mon law malice. Consider the statute as restated: "The truth in itself
and alone shall be a complete defense unless it shall be proved.., that
the publication was made with ill-will and for justifiable ends." As
this analysis indicates, the only logical interpretation the court can
make of the statute is that which defines actual malice as common law
malice.
B. Nebraska Case Law
Nebraska case law reveals that the court's interpretation of "actual
malice" as common law malice places Nebraska in the "truth plus mo-
tive" minority making the statute unconstitutional as applied.
The Nebraska Supreme Court established the "truth plus motive"
defense in several early civil and criminal defamation actions. The
most succinct formulation of the defense came in Pokrok Zapadu Pub.
Co. v. Ziskovsky, an 1894 slander action.6 8 There, the court stated that
"it would seem that even the truth is not a complete defense in an
action for libel, unless the libel was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends."69 In Ziskovsky, the plaintiff was accused of em-
bezzling $4.75 from a Bohemian cemetery association. The Nebraska
Supreme Court overturned the district court's decision because the de-
fendant, a local Bohemian language newspaper, failed to present any
evidence that the publisher was not motivated by malicious intent.
The court stated that, "In the absence of all evidence the law
presumes that, in the publication of an article which is libelous upon
its face, the publisher was actuated with a malicious intent."7 0 The
court, in essence, created a rebuttable presumption of common law
malice which required a defendant to prove his motive regardless of
the obvious truth of the statement. Subsequent cases did not utilize
this presumption, but the Ziskovsky court's strict use of it is indicative
of the premium early defamation law placed on the vindication of a
man's reputation.71
68. 42 Neb. 64, 60 N.W. 358 (1894). While Ziskovsky is cited here for its interpretation
of the "truth plus motive" defense, it is interesting to note that the court specifi-
cally rejected a form of constitutional malice as defined by New York Times. The
court stated, "[t]he publishing company did plead that at the time it made the
publication it had reason to believe, and did believe, that the charges made
therein were true. This was not a defense. It is no defense to a suit for libel that
the party sued had reasonable grounds to believe that the charge made was true.
Such facts, if shown, would not relieve the publisher of liability." Id at 78, 60
N.W. at 362.
69. Id- at 72, 60 N.W. at 360.
70. I& at 78, 60 N.W. at 362.
71. See infra notes 86-95.
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In Larson v. Cox, The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the
statutory predecessor of § 25-840, § 132 of the Nebraska Civil Proce-
dure Code, to allow truth as a complete defense in slander cases.72
The defendant in Larson had stated publicly that the plaintiff had
committed larceny. The court stated, "The truth of a defamatory pub-
lication is still a complete and perfect defense in a criminal case irre-
spective of the motive or object of the publisher."73 The court
continued to distinguish Ziskovsky and its requirement of the "truth
plus motive" defense stating that, "it is not necessary at this time to
either affirm or deny the doctrine of these cases, as the constitutional
provision with which they deal has no reference to actions for
slander."74
Of the early cases, Wertz v. Sprecher, a 1908 decision, seems to best
develop the desire for personal vindication with which proponents at-
tempt to justify the "truth plus motive" defense. 75 In Wertz, the
county attorney of Colfax County brought a civil libel action against
the publisher of the local newspaper.76 The defendant presented evi-
dence establishing the truth of the allegations made in the story. The
trial judge instructed the jury that if they found the evidence to be
true, they should find for the defendant. No mention was made at the
trial level of any requirement that the statement be made with ill-will,
and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The Nebraska
Supreme Court overturned this decision after a thorough discussion of
the justifications behind the "truth plus motive" defense.
The court based its decision and adoption of common law malice on
a comparative interpretation of the 1866 and 1875 Nebraska Constitu-
tions. The 1866 constitution stated,
In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libel the truth may be given in
evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous
be true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the
party shall be acquitted.77
The correlating provision in the 1875 Nebraska Constitution stated,
Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being re-
sponsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trial for libel, BOTH CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, shall be a sufficient defense 7 8
The court noted that the 1866 provision required good motives for
72. 68 Neb. 44, 93 N.W. 1011 (1903).
73. Id. at 45-46, 93 N.W. at 1012.
74. Id.
75. 82 Neb. 834, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908).
76. Id. at 834, 118 N.W. at 1071. The article stated, "County Attorney Wertz for the
prosecution and George W. Wertz for the defense get together and agree upon a
compromise and the wise county board upon motion duly made, seconded and
carried, endorse it." Id
77. NEB. CONST. of 1866, art I., § 3 (emphasis added).
78. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
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criminal libel actions only while the 1875 version added civil libel and
slander to the provision. The court credited the inclusion of civil defa-
mation in the 1875 version as evidence of the constitutional convention
delegates' conscious desire to apply "truth plus motive" defense to all
forms of defamation. Noting that the individual convention delegates
were predominately lawyers aware of the meaning and effect of their
words, the court stated that "the fact that the change was adopted
without debate demonstrates that the words employed in the amend-
ment were well known as applied.., and had a general and well un-
derstood meaning, which it was intended that they should continue to
have."79
The court in Wertz cited three states, Massachusetts, Maine, and
Florida, as influential precedent for their acceptance of the "truth plus
motive" defense.80 All of the precedents on which the Nebraska
Supreme Court relied on in Wertz have since been overturned.8 1 At
the time, the court completely overlooked the fact that Massachusetts'
and Maine's defense was statutorily based and did not result from a
state constitutional interpretation.8 2 Moreover, the Florida case cited
by the court was not decided until ten years after the Nebraska consti-
tutional convention prepared the questionable provisions and in no
way could have influenced the deliberations of the convention
delegates.8 3
The court also favorably cited People v. Croswell, a New York crim-
inal libel action in which Alexander Hamilton unsuccessfully asserted
the "truth plus motive" defense. 84 Hamilton's formulation of the de-
fense provided, "liberty of the press consists in the right to publish,
with impunity, truth, with good motives, for justifiable ends, though
reflecting on government, magistracy, or individual."85 The court rec-
ognized that Croswell was a criminal action that may have been of
questionable relevancy to a civil action but did not find this difference
to be of any overwhelming importance.8 6
79. Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 837, 118 N.W. at 1071, 1072 (1908).
80. Id. at 839-40, 118 N.W. at 1073.
81. See infra notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
82. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 797-805, 838. Franklin presents the argument that
constitutional language can be interpreted to provide an "outer limit" reading
that establishes a distant boundary which state legislatures are not to pass. In
fact statutory interpretive rules are quite different from those used to interpret
constitutions. If a statute is clear on its face it is unnecessary to resort to legisla-
tive history and purpose. However, when one is interpreting a constitution, re-
sort to the intent of the authors is often crucial. See also Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d. Cir. 1955).
83. The Florida case was decided in 1885. Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's
Adm'x, 21 Fla. 431 (1885).
84. 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804).
85. I& at 360.
86. Croswell was a criminal defamation action brought against Harry Croswell for
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One explanation the Wertz court gave for its opinion was based on
the view that, "kicking the reformed is 'repugnant to crudest ideas of
justice.' "87 This comment presents one of the more common justifica-
tions for the "truth plus motive" defense. Proponents of the defense
often state that a man's past is best left alone when he has sufficiently
reformed himself to a position of respect in the community.88 Adopt-
ing a high moral tone, the court discussed the rule stating, "It is repug-
nant to the crudest ideas of justice to say that, under such
circumstances, the truth of a recital of past history ought to entitle a
defendant to a verdict in a civil action."8 9 The Ziskovsky court also
addressed, rather poetically, the notion of fresh start for the reformed
man alluded to in the Wertz opinion. In reply to the defense counsel,
the court stated,
[I]t must not be forgotten that the same constitution which guaranties the
freedom of the press guaranties also to the individual life, liberty, the pursuit
of happiness, the protection of property, and, impliedly at least, reputation.
To all well disposed persons a good reputation is as dear and as valuable as
property. Indeed, a reputation for honesty is the only property possessed by
many people. It is not striking down the "liberty of the press" to hold it civilly
responsible for spreading broadcast over the land the false charge that an indi-
vidual has been guilty of a crime.9 0
This justification of the "truth plus motive" defense has special ap-
peal today when the media seems to take every opportunity to delve
into the long hidden past of every public figure.91 However, the de-
publishing certain "scandalous, malicious, inflammatory, and seditious matters of
and concerning" Thomas Jefferson. Id at 338. While arguing for the defense
Alexander Hamilton presented the classic formulation of the "truth plus motive"
defense. This defense was not successful in Croswell's case but was ultimately
included in New York's constitution and defamation statues. Franklin, supra
note 2, at 792.
87. Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 838, 118 N.W. 1071, 1072 (1908).
88. Id. See also NoRMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRE-
TIVE HIsToRY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 130-31 (1986). Rosenberg points out that the
rationale for adopting such a rule changed over time from the concept of protect-
ing the "best men" to protecting the private person who, having once committed
an indiscretion, has now reformed. The advocates of this form and rationale of
the test saw it as a protection of the individual's privacy.
89. Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 838, 118 N.W. 1071, 1072 (1908).
90. Pokrock Zapadu Pub. Co. v. Ziskovsky, 42 Neb. 64, 79, 60 N.W. 358, 362 (1894).
Interestingly, the court indicates that the paraphrase "life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness" is of constitutional origin. This classic statement of American social
and political beliefs comes not from the Constitution but rather from the Decla-
ration of Independence.
91. This criticism of an overreaching press is not unique to today. Harrison Gray
Otis, prominent Massachusetts attorney, in 1823 offered a similar criticism of the
press. "Otis contended that unfortunately, public and private virtue do not al-
ways go together; many great public leaders led less than exemplary private lives.
But the community's interest in good government might suffer if fear of scandal-
mongers kept talented people out of public service. Common sense, argued Otis,
suggested that, in 999 instances out of 1000, attacks on public officials stemmed
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fense, as formulated by Hamilton in 1804, served a better purpose in
the late Nineteenth century when men entered politics out of a sense
of public duty. The defense in effect protected the "best men" and
safeguarded the integrity of public debate.92 One commentator stated,
To most members of the early nineteenth century's legal and political estab-
lishments, the Hamiltonian emphasis upon truth, good motives, and justifiable
ends seemed a wise and legitimate accommodation between the need for pro-
tecting political criticism and the necessity for protecting the reputations of
the best men and for safeguarding the integrity of public debate.9 3
The altruistic Cincinnatus throwing down his plow to serve the state94
may have been an apt metaphor in early America; however, the meta-
phor is somewhat hollow today when politics is viewed as a profession
staffed by professional life-time politicians.95 Moreover, Eighteenth
Century Americans did not have the massive entertainment industry
and all its excesses forced on them as people do today. While the dis-
cussion of the media or entertainment figure may not be vital to public
debate or directly further the goals of self-government, defamed me-
dia stars can hardly be heard to complain of a defamatory statement or
an invasion of privacy when they thrust themselves and their lives in
the faces of the American public.
The court distinguished Larson and its holding that the truth is a
complete defense on the grounds that it involved a slander action
whereas the action in Wertz was based on libel.96 The court stated,
"Larson v. Cox was a slander suit, and all of the suggestions therein
concerning a defense in libel cases is dictum.... In so far as the dictum
in Larson v. Cox is opposed to the earlier cases, it is not adopted but
disapproved, nor was it ever law in this state."9 7
Strangely, the Nebraska Supreme Court and more specifically Jus-
tice Root, the author of the Wertz opinion, issued an opinion one year
after Wertz that defined malice quite differently. In Sheibley v. Nel-
son the court stated that,
malice in law will be presumed from the publication of an article libelous per
se, and that presumption will become conclusive unless the truth of the libel is
purely from malicious motives and from 'love of gossip' rather than from any real
desire to inform the public." ROSENBERG, supra note 88, at 119.
92. Id. at 110. "Hamilton hoped to convince lesser minds of both the need for permit-
ting political criticism against public leaders who merely pretended to possess
republican virtue and of the necessity for limiting defamatory attacks against the
reputations of truly virtuous public figures." Id.
93. Id. at 260.
94. Cincinnatus was a Roman citizen who desired only to live a simple life on his
farm. When the state needed his services to stave off enemy attacks, he dutifully
set asides his wishes and served the state.
95. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name:
An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 64 KY. L.J. 753
(1976).
96. Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 836, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908).
97. Id. 836-37, 118 N.W. at 1071, 1073.
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established. Such malice does not mean hatred or ill wil but the want of
legal excuse for the publication.98
"Want of legal excuse" is close to publishing without good motives or
for justifiable ends. While this definition is not a quoted repetition or
a restatement of the court's prior definition, it is something akin to
hatred or ill-will. "Want of legal excuse" focuses on the reason for
publication not the intense feelings conveyed by the ill-will definition
and actually broadens the scope of situations and range of motivations
that will defeat the truth defense. Under this "want of legal excuse"
formulation the publisher, unmotivated by hatred or ill-will, who
prints a humorous account of a true occurrence in good hearted jest
could be successfully sued for defamation. Whereas, under an "ill-will
or hatred" formulation of the defense only the intense harmful moti-
vation would suffice.
Whitcomb v. Nebraska State Education Association99 presented
the Nebraska courts with the first opportunity to construe the truth
defense after the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times. Whit-
comb was a civil libel action brought by a teacher who was discharged
because she was an alleged troublemaker. The majority opinion made
no effort to reconcile the "truth plus motive" defense with New York
Times, Garrison or any of the subsequent cases that held such a de-
fense to be unconstitutional. In fact, the court hardly discussed the
truth defense at all.
Justice Smith's concurring opinion in Whitcomb did raise the issue
of whether the "truth plus motive" defense complied with New York
Times decision and was thus constitutional. He stated, however, that
"[n]o constitutional issue of a federal dimension having been raised,
the majority opinion does not answer the question: Is the judgement
under review a product of an unconstitutional interference with free
expression?"100 Had the issues of the constitutionality of the "truth
plus motive" defense and the statute that established it been called
into question, it seems to follow from these comments that the court
would have addressed them.101
The court based its decision on New York Times principles in Kioch
98. 84 Neb. 393, 395-96, 121 N.W. 458, 459-60 (1909)(emphasis added).
99. 184 Neb. 31, 165 N.W.2d 99 (1969).
100. Id. at 37, 165 N.W.2d at 102 (Smith, J. concurring).
101. The court once again avoided determining the constitutionality of the "truth plus
motive" defense and Nebraska's statutes in Vodehnal v. Grand Island Daily In-
dependent, 191 Neb. 836, 218 N.W.2d 220 (1974). The plaintiff in Vodehnal as-
serted that the statute establishing Nebraska's "truth plus motive" defense-§ 25-
840-was unconstitutional. The court found other grounds to dismiss the suit and
stated, "We do not reach the questions of unconstitutionality posed in the plain-
tiff's brief. The court will refuse to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or
a rule promulgated by a court unless it is necessary for a proper disposition of an
action pending in this court." Id. at 838, 218 N.W.2d at 222. It seems clear, given
subsequent holdings, that the Nebraska Supreme Court will utilize this principle
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v. Ratcliffe.102 In Koch the plaintiff, a locomotive engineer brought
an action for slander against the railroad foreman for statements
made regarding the plaintiff's falsification of a time log. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the district court entered judge-
ment notwithstanding the verdict for the foreman.
Nowhere in its discussion of malice did the court in K/och refer to a
precedential Nebraska decision. Instead the court defined malicious
statements as those published "with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard as to whether they are true or false."103 Amazingly,
the court specifically quoted United States Supreme Court language
indicating that a jury instruction allowing a jury to impose liability
based on a finding of "the defendant's hatred, spite, ill-will or desire to
injure" was clearly impermissible. 04 The court further stated that,
"Ill will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives are not elements of the
New York Times standard."05
In 1986, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided Deaver v. Hinel. In
Deaver, a former county sheriff brought a libel action against a news-
paper columnist for stories criticizing the sheriff's official conduct. 0 6
Once again the case was decided strictly on the principles set forth in
New York Times, including the interpretation of actual malice as con-
stitutional malice established therein. 0 7 This was most likely because
the defendant based his cause of action on the New York Times princi-
ples. 0 8 The court sidestepped the determination of the constitutional-
ity of the "truth plus motive" defense and Nebraska's original
statutory interpretation of actual malice as common law malice. It
stated that,
[t]his case is one of federal constitutional law, the analysis and outcome are
controlled by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny. Neither party
relies on or cites Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-840 .... The issue not squarely before us,
we do not decided the effect, if any, of this statute on public official libel law-
suits or the effect, if any, of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on the statute.' 0 9
Deaver, Kloch, and Whitcomb do little to help predict the future of the
"truth plus motive" defense in Nebraska. Rather it only indicates two
practical matters: 1) that the court knows how to correctly approach
of judicial abstention until compelled by the circumstances of a particular case to
confront the constitutionality of the defense.
102. 221 Neb. 241, 375 N.W.2d 916 (1985).
103. Id. at 249, 375 N.W.2d at 921.
104. Id. at 250, 375 N.W.2d at 922, citing Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281
(1974).
105. Id.
106. 223 Neb. 529, 391 N.W.2d 128 (1986).
107. Id.
108. The court stated that, "Deaver filed this action, claiming that the allegations in
the column and letter about him, were false, and were made with actual malice as
defined in New York Times Co. v Sullivan." Id. at 532, 391 N.W.2d at 130.
109. Id. at 532, 391 N.W. 2d at 131.
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the truth defense and 2) a party wishing to avoid the "truth plus mo-
tive" defense need only plead and argue New York Times principles to
sidestep the issue. These matters are evident from the court's willing-
ness to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the statute and their
unexceptional application of the constitutional malice standard.
The early cases, Larson and Wertz, indicate that Nebraska courts
recognized a distinction in libel and slander cases. In Larson the court
allowed the truth of the slanderous statements as a complete defense
to a slander action.1 10 Consequently the court could have allowed
truth as a complete defense in Kloch, a slander action, and not relied
on Constitutional principles or cases. In Wertz, the Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected truth as a complete defense to libel actions
and limited Larson to slander situations.'1 ' However, in Deaver, a li-
bel action, the court did not apply the "truth plus motive" defense, and
failed to rely on Wertz or any other Nebraska precedent. The court
had in one short year the ability to remove an archaic element of defa-
mation law and a presently artificial distinction between libel and
slander, but the court refused to discuss the "truth plus motive" de-
fense much less strike it from Nebraska law. Consequently, the dis-
tinction between libel and slander, the court established long ago in
Larson and Wertz, may be currently relevant.
Turner v. Welliver, a civil libel case decided in 1987, does indicate
the direction the Nebraska courts intend to follow with respect to the
"truth plus motive" defense, at least as it relates to a private figure."12
In Turner, an insurance agent brought a libel action against the presi-
dent of a marketing corporation, based on a letter written about the
agent. The letter implied that the plaintiff had forged the signature of
several customers on crop insurance policies. The defendant
presented evidence indicating that all of the statements in the letter
regarding the plaintiff were true. The trial court found that the de-
fendant was not liable. It based this decision on New York Times prin-
ciples as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B. 113
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the trial court but still ex-
amined the "truth plus motive" defense. Stating that it had never de-
fined common law actual malice in a majority opinion,"14 the court
determined that actual malice may be defined as "hate, spite, or ill
will."115 The court used the permissive "may' in defining actual mal-
110. See supra notes 73-74.
111. See supra notes 96-97.
112. Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 (1987).
113. Interestingly, the court never explicitly declared that the trial court's reliance on
the New York Times standards as embodied in the Restatement was an error.
114. Wertz was a majority opinion.
115. Turner v. Welliver, 226 Neb. at 290, 411 N.W.2d at 309. Continuing to state that
this definition was adopted only for purpose of the present case, the court did not
unilaterally adopt a common law malice standard.
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ice rather than the directive "shall." These subtle semantics may indi-
cate that the court is not absolutely defining actual malice, but only
offering a permissible interpretation subject to change.
Nebraska statutes and the Nebraska Constitution retain the "truth
plus motive" defense. Nebraska court decisions indicate that the
"truth plus motive" defense may be the current law in this state, at
least with respect to private figure cases. When viewed together,
Deaver and Turner may indicate that in defamation situations involv-
ing public figures constitutional malice will be used, while in private
figure situations the common law malice standard will be applied.
However, the application of the New York Times standards in Deaver
does not unequivocally establish which standards the court will apply
in future public figure defamation cases. This uncertainty is the result
of the court's explicit refusal to construe Nebraska's statute in light of
constitutional standards.116 The nimble steps that the court has taken
to avoid review of the constitutionality of the defense in public figure
cases may indicate that while the court realizes the unconstitutional
character of a "truth plus motive" defense, it is not willing to squarely
confront the issue a litigant appropriately asserts the defense's uncon-
stitutionality or until legislative action indicates the direction to be
taken.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A "TRUTH PLUS
MOTIVE" DEFENSE
The First Amendment of the Constitution states, "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."117
Read broadly, the First Amendment classifies all defamation law as
law which abridges the freedom of the press and freedom of speech.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that some types
of speech are not protected by the First Amendment, and defamatory
speech is one of these types.1 18 However, in New York Times the
Supreme Court brought defamation law under the protection of the
First Amendment when it stated that, "libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment."'119 The Court recog-
nized that the defamatory statement is inevitable in the rough and
tumble world of public debate, and in order to avoid chilling desirable
speech, some protection was required for the occasional misstep. It
follows that if defamatory speech is to be measured by constitutional
116. See Deaver v. Hinel, 223 Neb. 529, 391 N.W.2d 128 (1986).
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
118. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
119. Id. at 269.
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standards then defenses to libel must also be measured by similar
standards.
The language in New York Times and the subsequent United
States Supreme Court decisions discussed above irrefutably indicate
that Nebraska's "truth plus motive" defense is unconstitutional under
current constitutional standards. It is difficult to imagine a more con-
demnatory statement of the defense than, "truth may not be the sub-
ject of civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is
concerned."120 Given this statement, it appears that little more needs
to be discussed regarding the impermissibility of the "truth plus mo-
tive" defense. Nonetheless, a closer review is necessary to highlight
the inherent incompatibility of the "truth plus motive" defense with
the First Amendment protection and the nature of public debate in
this country.
A. Inhibitory Effects and Self-Censorship
Benjamin Franklin, a Founding Father and a journalist, stated in
an Apology for Printers that "if all printers were determin'd [sic] not
to print any thing till they were sure it would offend no body, there
would be very little printed."' 2I Although written well before the
Constitution and a revolution were considered, Franklin's words high-
light the inhibition and self-censorship caused by the "truth plus mo-
tives defense". The truth defense negates these effects because it
provides the publisher with the assurance that he will not be liable for
making true statements merely because some one feels the statements
were published with the intention to inflict harm. This assurance,
theoretically, leads the publisher to print or broadcast vast amounts of
information, creating an informed public that is vital to a democratic
government.
Conversely, the requirement that a publisher demonstrate good
motives and justifiable ends, in addition to the truth of his statement,
unnecessarily inhibits speech and causes self-censorship due to the
subjectivity of the inquiry. The subjective nature of the good motives
and justifiable ends inquiry makes the standards a court would utilize
uncertain. Who can say exactly what a good motivation or a justifiable
end is?122 Extrinsic evidence of personal animosity or bias could be
120. Id. at 271-72.
121. Benjamin Franklin, Apology for Printers, in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITINGS 171
(J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1987).
122. Early courts interpreted good motives to be any motivation to promote the public
welfare. Justifiable ends usually meant a desire to inform the public of relevant
information regrading the government or elections. LAWHORNE, supra note 20, at
61-63. Massachusetts defined "justifiable ends" as "pleading or other judicial pro-
ceedings, or petitions for removal of officers, or criticisms of public officials, or
matters of common interest." Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212
(1808); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 15 Am. Dec. 214 (1825).
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used to establish that a person published a true statement without
good motives, but it is difficult to see what type of evidence the pub-
lisher could present to vindicate his motives or to justify the situa-
tion. 2 3 Instead of a judicious weighing of recognizable standards, the
trial could degenerate into a "yes, you did" versus "no, I did not" quar-
rel. The uncertainty generated from these subjective standards could
cause the publisher to hesitate before fully reporting a story involving
a public official. Even if the justifiable situations and motives are in-
terpreted broadly, the media would still be overly cautious in publish-
ing critical stories of public officials due to the possibility that the facts
in a specific situation would fall within the definition but still present
a flavor of ill-will to the trier of fact. 2 4
In any defamation situation, the defendant must be prepared to
prove the truth of the statement. In today's litigious climate where
every questionable story is checked and rechecked, the publisher has
probably already prepared to defend the truth of the article. 25 The
publisher, however, has probably not prepared for an inquiry into the
motive for publishing the story. Imagine the difficulty a publisher
faces in attempting to convince a jury that his motivation was not a
desire to lash out against a one-time rival or enemy but rather a disin-
terested desire to inform the public. It seems reasonable to assume
that the publisher would face the difficult task of proving genuine
public concern and an absence of personal animosity armed only with
purely subjective evidence. The publisher could present his record of
public service or publishing history, but even this seemingly objective
proof could be overcome by the emotional and subjective evidence of
personal relationships with the plaintiff. In the end, the question
would be left to the whims of the jury, and it is not difficult to predict
their result given the public hostility toward the media.
The burden a publisher might face in proving his good motive will
likely be increased if the libel plaintiff is a popular public figure. One
commentator has stated, "prejudice is a danger to all who publish un-
popular truths, for again it may be difficult to convince a jury that the
123. Early cases interpreting what ends were justifiable held that the requirement of
good motives and justifiable ends was met by an honest intent to inform citizens
about public officials. LAWHORNE, supra note 20, at 62-64.
124. The possibility of juror bias would be prevalent in the often heated rhetoric of
political debate where emotions run as high as the political stakes involved. See
notes 108-11 and accompanying text. The overblown exaggeration is common in
the political press, and Madison recognized the possible abuses that might follow
in the political debate when he stated, "some degree of abuse is inseparable from
the proper use of everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that of
the press." 4 J. ELLIoTr, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 571
(1876).




unpopular speaker told the truth without improper motive."126 The
facts of New York Times illustrate this point. The plaintiff in New
York Times was a popular, local, white Southern official who brought
an action against four local, black ministers and the liberal Northern
press that supported the civil rights movement. Considering the
Southerner's ingrained prejudices and their siege mentality of the
early 1960's, it is easy to understand the difficult task the defense law-
yers faced in proving any issue in the case. Had the defense also been
forced to prove the advertisements were run with a good motive, the
outcome of the case might have been a foregone conclusion. It seems
reasonable to say that no Southern juror of that time period could
have been convinced that the New York Times was motivated by any-
thing less than negative feelings and general animosity toward South-
ern institutions and government.127
Hostile public sentiment toward the media and the popularity of a
public figure are factors a publisher would be forced to consider in
deciding whether to refrain from publishing unpopular but p6ssibly
necessary truthful information if the "truth plus motive" defense is
recognized. The United States Supreme Court highlighted these con-
cerns in Garrison:
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the
risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred.... Under a rule
... permitting a finding of malice based on an intent merely to inflict harm,
rather than an attempt to inflict harm through falsehood, "it becomes a haz-
ardous matter to speak out against a popular politician ... [In the case of
charges against a popular political figure it may be almost impossible to show
freedom of ill-will or selfish political motives."' 1 2 8
The political arena is one of the primary areas that generates such
strong emotion, promotes the development of extremely controversial
figures, and would present the most difficult decisions for a publisher.
It would be relatively easy for a defeated political candidate to present
evidence that a smear campaign based on true facts was motivated by
his opponent's desire to do him harm. However, the truthful informa-
tion may have been vitally relevant to the defeated candidate's charac-
ter or policies, but the publisher was forced to weigh the expense of
defending his motivation against the necessity of informing the public.
It would be the altruistic and possibly rare publisher who would tip
the scales in favor of publishing the information and face a potential
lawsuit. While it would be somewhat more difficult for a newspaper
to prove it was motivated by ill-will rather than a desire to inform the
126. Franklin, supra note 2, at 809.
127. See, Harry Kalven, Jr. The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning
of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 194-200 (1964); Hall, supra note
18.
128. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,70,74 (1964)(quoting Noel, Defamation of Pub-
lic Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 893 (1949)).
1260 [Vol. 72:1236
1993] COMMON LAW MALICE AND DEFAMATION
public, the mere threat of a lawsuit often suffices to restrict publica-
tion and inhibit the dissemination of information in an area where it is
most needed.129
Considering the necessity of public debate and the potential of
heated exchanges in the political arena, it becomes apparent that the
"truth plus motive" defense is an inappropriate and illogical way to
regulate the discussion of public affairs. 3 0 Animosity and motive are
justifiable concerns when a government, frightened of sedition, at-
tempts to suppress speech. However, when a government wants,
needs, and is required to promote public speech and debates by its con-
stitution, the true statement made in hatred is just as valuable as the
true statement made from a sense of civic duty.
One of the primary purposes of the New York Times decision was
to diminish the threat of large libel decisions131 the reduction of which
would increase the press' incentive to print the material necessary for
a debate on public issues to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 3 2
The "truth plus motive defense" is in contradiction to the Court's
stated purpose. When a publisher is always forced to consider
whether his motivation could be considered malicious, he will write a
story differently or decide that the risk of publishing the story out-
weighs the benefit to the public. Such a result is not the uninhibited,
robust and wide open debate the Supreme Court or the Founding Fa-
thers envisioned. 33 In fact, such a result is self-censorship.
The Court did not address the self-censorship result of the "truth
plus motive" defense in New York Times. They did, however, discuss
the self-censorship that a strict liability standard would cause. The
Court stated,
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions - and to do so on pain of libel judgements virtually unlimited
in amounts - leads to ... 'self-censorship.'... Under such a rule, would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
129. See note 131-33.
130. The motive of the publisher does not diminish the social utility of the discussion
nor does it tip the balance in favor of protecting the public figures reputation.
The Supreme Court indicated as much in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). "The Constitutional protection does not turn on the truth, popu-
larity or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." I& at 271 (quot-
ing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). The Court expressed a similar
sentiment in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). "Even if he did speak out
of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas
and the ascertainment of truth." Id- at 74.
131. The Court stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "Whether or
not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgements, the pall of fear and
timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmos-
phere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." Id- at 278.
132. Id. at 270. See also David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX.
L. REV. 422, 425 (1975).
133. See supra notes 117-120.
1261
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone."
134
The Supreme Court was afraid that imposing strict liability and
forcing the defamation defendant to prove the entire truth of a state-
ment would cause the media to withhold true but difficult-to-prove
statements from publication.135 The "truth plus motive" defense real-
izes the Court's fears as it is more restrictive than a strict liability
standard and the generally accepted truth defense. Not only must the
libel defendant prove the truth of the statement but also that he pub-
lished without ill will and for justifiable ends. In contrast to the diffi-
cult task the defamation defendant faces when required merely to
prove the truth of the statement, the effort and expense required of a
defamation defendant under the "truth plus motive" defense to prove
that he published a true statement without ill-will or improper motive
presents an almost impossible task.13 6
The exact type and amount of self-censorship that might result
from the "truth plus motive" defense is difficult to determine. It may
occur at any level of the process, and as one commentator stated,
"[m]uch of it is inherently unmeasurable; it occurs whenever a re-
porter or editor omits a word, a passage, or an entire story, not for
journalistic reasons but because of the possible legal implications."137
The reporter and editor may begin making decisions not based on
what is good news or vital to the public concern, but rather on the
impact the story may have on a public figure. If this is so, the control
of the press, albeit indirect control, is removed from the people and
placed in the hands of public officials and figures. Such a result is
reminiscent of the government's control of seditious libel and is dia-
metrically opposed to the vision on which this country is based.
The people that make the actual decisions to suppress a story or
news statement because of potential libel problems are usually not the
134. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)(quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).)
135. Anderson, supra note 132, at 428-29. This fear has been alleviated somewhat due
to the fact that the burden of proving the truth of the statement has been shifted.
Under New York Times, the libel plaintiff must prove the falsity of the statement
at least in public figure cases. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986).
136. "[D]efendants are often the real losers in libel suits today, even when they win in
court, because the rules established to protect defendants' freedom of speech ac-
tually work against the First Amendment: by making it so expensive to litigate
the question of 'knowing or reckless falsity,' for instance, the rules exert a 'chil-
ling effect' on free expression, encouraging potential defendants to play it safe in
their journalism." Robert J. Harley, An Overview of the Uniform Defamation
Act, 338 PLI/PAT. 645, 653 (1992).
137. Anderson, supra note 132 at 430-31.
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reporters and editors. It seems reasonable to say that the ultimate
goals of the beat reporter are vastly different from the goals of the
publisher and the libel lawyer. The journalism profession is powered
by a strong professional ethic.138 This professional ethic often gener-
ates a strong will to inform the public even at the risk of possible liti-
gation. One commentator stated, "[A]lithough impossible to measure,
this professional pressure to publish is probably the strongest force
against self-censorship."s 9 The publishers, station owners, and libel
lawyers who will usually determine that a story is a potentially
libelous may not share this altruistic desire to print "all the news that
is fit to print." Their decisions will not be based on any journalistic
commitment to informing the public.140 In fact, these decision are
quite often based on purely economic and legal reasons.14 1 One com-
mentator discussed this conflict of goals, stating-
A reporter who has invested his time and talent in a story and risked his credi-
bility by presenting it for publication has a strong interest in seeing it pub-
lished or broadcast. The owner, on the other hand, usually has no
psychological stake in the story, feels less professional pressure to publish it,
and has a stronger financial incentive to avoid the risk. Thus, no matter how
keenly the libel lawyer may appreciate the interest of the public (and the
newsroom) in running the story, when a conflict develops he must protect the
interests of his client the publisher, or station owner.142
The self-censorship caused by the "truth plus motives" defense af-
fects not only the Nebraska media but also the entire national media
complex. At first glance, it is difficult to see how a news story printed
in a small Nebraska town could impact the journalist in Kentucky or
California. But the national character of the news media requires
138. See THE SOCETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNAiST'S CODE OF JOURNALisTIc ETHICS,
1992.
139. Anderson, supra note 132, at 434. "Reporters and editors share a professional
ethic that encourages them to seek to inform the public, even at the risk of libel
litigation. This may even be institutionalized, so that it represents the prevailing
ethic of a publishing or broadcasting organization; 'all the news that's fit to print'
presumably includes some news that creates a danger of legal action .... Journal-
ism reviews and media critics are becoming increasingly active in exposing press
timidity. Editors, publishers, and broadcasters value the esteem of their profes-
sional peers, and the honors frequently go to those who have been willing to take
chances." Id.
140. Id. at 438; See also, Fuson, supra note 125.
141. Anderson, supra note 132, at 438.
142. Id. at 439. The economic incentive of getting the best scoop has all but disap-
peared with the passing of the competing newspapers in a single city. Anderson
stated, "[Tihe press has virtually no economic incentive to publish anything that
might lead to a libel suit. In the case of daily newspapers, whatever incentive was
once provided by the danger that a competitor would publish the suppressed ma-
terial has largely disappeared along with competition." Id. at 433. In 1963, 51
cities had competing daily newspapers; in 1973, 37 cities, and in 1983, 30 cities.
The numbers today are much lower. LUCAS A. PowE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE
AND THE CONSTITUTION-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 201 (1991).
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every journalist covering a Nebraska topic to consider the defensibility
of her motivation behind writing a story. One commentator wrote,
news of politics, of business of education, of fashion, and a variety of topics is
increasingly national news. To have the standards of responsibility hammered
out on a state's rights basis when communications are disseminated to one
Union is at least anomalous.... To have the balance struck not once but fifty
times in as many states is ill calculated to serve the national interest. ' 1 4 3
The facts of New York Times highlight the impact a local action
can have on the national media. The advertisement that generated
the L. B. Sullivan's libel suit appeared in the Times. In 1960, when the
advertisement was published, there were only thirty-four daily sub-
scribers to the Times in Montgomery, Alabama, the home of the plain-
tiff. In fact, only 394 daily copies of the Times were delivered in the
entire state of Alabama, out of a total daily circulation of approxi-
mately 650,000. The Times had no corporate offices in Alabama, and
its advertising revenues from Alabama in the six months prior to the
advertisement had been $18,000 out of a total of $37,500,000.34 From
this limited circulation base, a local official was able to secure a
$500,000 libel judgement from a national media source.145
In 1960, the international wire services were not as developed nor
was the pervasive influence of television felt as extensively as it is to-
day. With today's information flood, the reach of a libel plaintiff's ac-
tion is far greater than L.B. Sullivan's was in 1960. Consequently,
journalists across the country that pick up on a wire story involving a
Nebraska public official could have their motives questioned in a dis-
tant court for running a story they did not even write. In reference to
143. Willard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libek The Modern Re-
vised Translation, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 581, 583 (1964).
144. Hall, supra note 18. The defense counsel of the New York Times made a special
appearance to challenge the Alabama court's jurisdiction over the newspaper.
Once commentator stated.
Embry [defense counsel] argued that the Alabama courts had no jurisdic-
tion in the case since only 394 of the 650,000 issues of the New York
Times in which the ad appeared circulated in the state. To make the
argument before the Alabama court, however, Embry was required to
make what is known as a special appearance. Arguments before a judge
in Alabama were usually made in what was called a general appearance.
To argue a jurisdictional matter in a general appearance, however,
rather than a special appearance, would be to concede that the court held
jurisdiction. To make his special appearance, Embry followed the form
given in a leading text, Alabama Pleading and Practice Law. The text
was written by Judge Walter P. Jones-the very Walter P. Jones who
was the trial judge in the Sullivan case. Jones, however, overruled his
own book and held that Embry had made a general appearance, thereby
placing the Times under the court's jurisdiction.
HopKiNs, supra note 35, at 14.
145. This judgement was the largest in Alabama history. The New York Times case
was also the first time in United States history that the Supreme Court had is-
sued a writ of certiorari to review a state libel judgement. LAWHoRNE, supra note
20, at 216.
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the tactic of pulling out of state media defendants into state courts,
Justice Black in his concurring opinion to New York Times stated,
"this technique for harassing and punishing a free press... is by no
means limited to cases with racial overtones; it can be used in other
fields where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state
newspapers easy prey for libel verdict seekers."146
B. Infringement on the Right of Self-Government
The proper functioning of our political system requires an in-
formed electorate.147 Whenever the public is deprived of truthful in-
formation regarding public affairs or officials, the voters do not
possess the full range of information required to make informed deci-
sions. Nebraska's requirement that any published statement be true
and published with good motives and for justifiable ends in order to
avoid a potential defamation action, inhibits the free flow of informa-
tion and results in self-censorship of by the media industry.148 As a
result of this inhibitory effect, the Nebraska electorate may be de-
prived of all the pieces of information it needs to complete the picture
of a public official or a public issue.
The First Amendment protects a person's right to obtain all the
pieces of information necessary to make informed decisions through
unfettered public debate. The United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the presence of this right in the First Amendment several
times. Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California,149 "freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth." Justice Marshall also
stated in Landmark Communication Inc. v. Virginia,15 0 "Whatever
differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
amendment was to protect the free discussion of government affairs."
146. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295.
147. People seem to care about the government that serves them. Impassioned com-
ment on government actions and public figures follows from this emotion. The
Supreme Court recognized the vital nature of public debate and sought to protect
such impassioned commentary in the New York Times opinion and the cases that
followed it. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-80 (1964); Gar-
rison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964); Greenbelt v. Cooperative Pub. Ass'n, 398
U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970). Discussing the necessity of both public debate and an unin-
hibited press in the operation of our government, the Court stated that "the peo-
ple of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties, are in the long view, essential
to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democ-
racy." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)(quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).).
148. See notes 121-146 and accompanying text.
149. 274 U.S. 354, 375 (1927).
150. 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978).
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However, individuals have long had a recognized interest and right to
the vindication and protection of their personal reputations.15' A
man's reputation was often all he had as entered the new world of
America, and many a duel was fought over the real slander or the
imagined slight to a man's good name.152
Public debate is undoubtedly an essential and natural element of
our society. However, our society has also long valued reputation and
the right of every man to vindicate that reputation whenever he is
defamed. Of these two competing interests, which is the more impor-
tant? Must a person's interest in protecting his reputation fall in front
of society's need for uninhibited public debate? The Supreme Court
has indicated that it must. The Court has stated, "Where the criticism
of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in
private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest secured
by the Constitution in the dissemination of truth."5 3 The Supreme
Court discussed this balance more thoroughly in New York Times.154
Nebraska's "truth plus motive" defense does not provide the broad
protection for public discussion that the United States Supreme
Court's statements indicate that such debate should receive. It ele-
vates the individual's interest in reputation above the societal need for
public debate and self-government. The Supreme Court has indicated
that, at least in public figure defamation actions, the public interest
must outweigh the private.155
151. Shakespeare stated this interest most poetically,
"Who steals my purse steals trash;
'tis something, nothing;,
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."
Othello Act III Sc. iii.
152. See W.J. CAsH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1939).
153. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964).
154. The importance to the state and to society of such discussion is so vast,
and the advantages derived are so great that they more than counterbal-
ance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be in-
volved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield
to public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private
character is so small that such discussion must be privileged.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964).
155. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in New York Times highlights a distinction
offered by proponents of the "truth plus motive" defense as a justification. He
felt that the private lives of public officials should be off limits to public discus-
sion. Justice Douglas stated, "This is not to say that the Constitution protects
defamatory statements directed against the private conduct of a public official or
private citizen.... Purely private defamation has little to do with the political
ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation
does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by
the First Amendment." I&L at 301-02. This statement should be contrasted with
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That is not to say, however, that all speech is valuable to the public
debate and that self-governing interests must always trump the per-
sonal interests in reputation. Defamation law and possibility the
"truth plus motive" defense do have a place in the permissible regula-
tion of speech and the discussion of private affairs.56
The Nebraska case, McCune v. Neitzel, presents a situation in
which defamation law and the "truth plus motive" test could serve a
legitimate regulatory purpose outside of the area of public debate. 5 7
In McCune, the defendant passed the rumor along that the plaintiff
was infected with the HIV virus. The defendant had not contracted
the virus, and as a result of the embarrassment and social disdain
caused by this rumor, the defendant was forced to quit his hometown
job and move to a distant city to secure work. 58 The defendant on
appeal asserted that the plaintiff was required to prove that she had
made the statements with malicious intent or ill will. The court, how-
ever, noted that since the defendant had not raised the truth of the
defamatory remarks as a defense the plaintiff was not required to
prove common law malice.159
The defendant's speech in this action arguably does not serve any
self-governing purpose. A gossip's rumor that a local man had AIDS
adds little to the marketplace of ideas. Even if such a rumor were
true, the truth in this situation bears no direct relationship to the self
governing process. The truth it only fuels the fires of gossip. In such a
situation motive may be important. If the speaker was motivated by a
desire to protect an insuspecting sexual partner of the defendant then
the "truth plus motive" defense does not hinder the legitimate pur-
pose of protecting the speaker whose motive was to protect an individ-
ual and arguably public health. However, if the speaker was
motivated by a desire to alert the customers of the local cafe about the
hottest news in town, the "truth plus motive" defense serves the pur-
pose of checking harmful speech that, although truthful, serves no le-
Brennan's statement that "public men, are, as it were, public property." Id. at
269.
156. The regulatory/inhibitory distinction is highlighted by the "Fire" analogy. A per-
son may not yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater without suffering the criminal and
civil sanctions that would follow. These sanctions serve the necessary function of
protecting public safety. Such regulation is necessary to a safe and orderly society
and is within the scope of the self-governing purpose of the First Amendment.
For example, the regulations that dictate how and when a group may conduct a
public demonstration march or the regulations that indicate the process by which
a person may petition the government are permissible regulation within the self-
governing purpose of the First Amendment because they do not abridge the right
to speak. They simply operate for the public's safety.
157. McCune v. Neitzel, 235 Neb. 754, 457 N.W.2d 803 (1990).
158. Id at 758, 457 N.W.2d at 807.
159. The court stated. "Proof of common law malice is at issue only when truth or a
conditional privilege has been asserted by the declarant." Id. at 810.
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gitimate social purpose.16 0
Defamation law and the private figure/public figure distinction il-
lustrate the distinction between the permissible regulatory function
and the self-governing nature of the First Amendment. In a private
defamation action, an individual allegedly harms another's reputation,
and the defamed person may sue for damages. The United States
Supreme Court has indicated that improper motive may be a reason-
able and defensible element of private defamation.61 The First
Amendment should give no protection in the private defamation situa-
tion because "[a person's] verbal [or written] attack has no relation to
the business of governing."162 However, a similar attack made on a
public official to uncover illegal activities or a comment offered re-
garding her fitness for office is a part of governing, constituting a citi-
zen's participation in self government.1 63 Motivation in this context is
not relevant.164 The publisher is exercising his right to participate in
the process of governing, and "even if he did speak out of hatred, ut-
terances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas
and the ascertainment of truth."165 Thus, "constitutional protection
does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered.' "166 An individual's comments on pub-
lic affairs or officials receive First Amendment protection because
they "are 'public' issues concerning which under our form of govern-
ment, he has authority, and is assumed to have competence, to judge.
Though private libel is subject to control, political or seditious libel is
not."167
The wisdom of any law regulating the free flow of information to
the public must be balanced against the need for unfettered communi-
cation and discussion regarding public affairs. 168 If a law, or in the
instant case, the "truth plus motive" defense unreasonably or unnec-
essarily restrict the flow of information to the public, it should be de-
clared unconstitutional as an infringement on the self-governing
process.169 The "truth plus motive" defense, such as Nebraska's, un-
160. See notes 161-67.
161. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
162. Id. at 359.
163. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273, 275 (1964); Alexander
Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 253
(1969).
164. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, at 73 (1964).
165. Id.
166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)(quoting N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
167. Id.
168. This balancing test is suggested in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
169. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 70-73 (1964).
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reasonably restricts the type and amount of information the public re-
ceives and causes the press to censor themselves out of fear of
expensive libel actions. Thus, Nebraska's defense of "truth plus mo-
tive" should be declared unconstitutional.
V. THE "TRUTH PLUS MOTIVE DEFENSE" IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
After the Croswell definition' 70 of the "truth plus motive" defense
was included in the New York Constitution171, several states over the
years, including Nebraska incorporated wording similar to Hamilton's
into their statutes or constitution. These statutes remained unchal-
lenged until the New York Times and Garrison decisions presented
libel defendants with Supreme Court precedent with which to attack
the constitutionality of the defense. Several states have adapted their
defamation laws to the New York Times standards. In fact the three
states-Massachusetts, Maine, and Florida-that the Nebraska
Supreme Court cited as influential precedent in Wertz, have all since
followed the Supreme Court's lead and limited or overruled the "truth
plus motive" defense.
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts limited the use of common
law malice and the "truth plus motive" defense in Milhalik v Du-
prey.172 The court stated "the meaning of 'actual malice' as used in
that section plainly cannot be continued with respect to public officers
and public figures."173 Massachusetts courts prior to Milhalik defined
actual malice in the common law sense as the absence of good will or
justifiable ends.174 Massachusetts courts recognized the opportunity
the Supreme Court left open in Gertz to formulate a different stan-
dard for private individual defamation cases outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. The court's statement in Milhalik that "with
respect to public officers and public figures" the "truth plus motive"
defense could not be continued in "view of the New York Times case,"
seems to indicate the motive underlying the defense will still be per-
missible in private individual defamation cases in Massachusetts.175
Maine courts have taken a similar approach by requiring a public
official to meet the requirements of the New York Times test. In
170. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
171. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1821).
172. 417 N.E.2d 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). The Massachusetts statute, similar to Ne-
braska's, provides, "The defendant in an action for writing or for publishing a
libel may introduce in evidence the truth of the matter contained in the publica-
tion charged as libelous; and the truth shall be a justification unless actual malice
is proved." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 92 (West 1991).
173. Milhalik v. Duprey, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
174. Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 28 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1940).
175. Milhalik v. Duprey, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
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Michaud v. Inhabitants of the Town of Livermore the court stated,
"New York Times teaches us that Michaud [the plaintiff], as a public
official, must in order to make out his claim of actionable defamation
prove, not only that the defamatory statements... were in fact false,
but that also, [the defendants] made the statements with knowledge
that they were false."17 6 The court continued to distinguish constitu-
tional malice from common law malice stating:
'actual malice' is so used, however, in a specialized, rather than a literal sense;
it refers to the publisher's knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity. The
term 'actual malice,' so used as shorthand for 'knowledge or reckless disre-
gard,' is to be distinguished from malice in the sense of ill-will or animosity.
Animosity or even a desire to injure the other party does not alone constitute
the 'actual malice' that takes the statement outside the First Amendment
protections.1 7 7
Maine case law indicates that the "truth plus motive" defense may be
applicable in private individual defamation cases just as Massachusetts
does.178 Additionally, the Michaud language seems to indicate that
common law malice may be probative of constitutional malice.
Florida courts have limited the application of the "truth plus mo-
tive" defense and made the distinction between constitutional malice
and common law malice quite clear through In re Standard Jury In-
structions. 79 Approving a recommended jury instruction for use in a
defamation case, the court applied the New York Times standard in
cases involving public officials or public figure claimants.180 In cases
involving private claimants and non-media defendants the court ap-
proved an instruction detailing the "truth plus motive" defense adopt-
ing common law malice in these situations.18 ' By allowing the "truth
plus motive" defense in private individual cases and not in public fig-
ure cases, the Florida jury instructions highlight the public figure/pri-
vate individual distinction the Supreme Court suggested in Gertz.1 8 2
Nebraska courts have not directly applied the public figure/private
individual distinction to the "truth plus motive" defense in a decision
to date. However, the facts of several cases discussed herein and the
standards applied in them indicate that the Nebraska Supreme Court
176. 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me. 1978).
177. Id. See also Tucci v. Guy Gannet Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 165-66 (Me. 1983).
178. See Tucci v. Guy Gannet Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161 (Me. 1983).
179. 575 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1991).
180. The approved instruction provided "ly]ou must next determine whether clear
and convincing evidence shows that at the statement was made (defendant) knew
the statement was false or had serious doubts as to its truth." Id. at 196.
181. Under the heading "Defense issues of truth and good motives" the approved in-
struction states "[oin the [first] defense, the issue for your determination is
whether statement made by the (defendant) was substantially true and was made
by (defendant) with good motives." Id. at 197. See also Della Donna v. Gore
Newspaper Co., 489 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1986)(application of the New York Times stan-
dards to a public figure case).
182. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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may make such a distinction and limit the application of the "truth
plus motive" defense to private individual cases. In Deaver, the plain-
tiff, a former county sheriff, would likely be considered a public figure
under the current United States Supreme Court tests. The court ana-
lyzed the case under the constitutional malice standards prefacing its
opinion with "[tihe issue not squarely before us, we do not decide the
effect, if any, of this statute [25-840] on public official libel law-
suits." 8 3 The court's utilization of the constitutional malice standards
in this public official case may indicate that the "truth plus motive"
defense will not apply to public official cases. One case, however, is
not a reliable indicator on the court's future response.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the "truth plus motive"
defense in McCune v. Neitzel, a private individual case. 1S4 The defend-
ant in McCune spread the rumor that the defendant had contracted
the HIV virus. The court did not discuss the "truth plus motive" de-
fense because the defendant did not plead it as an affirmative defense;
however, the court did indicate that had the defense been affirma-
tively pled the hate, spite or ill-will definition of malice would have
been used.'8 5 Additionally, the court utilized the "truth plus motive"
defense in Turner v. Welliver, another private individual defamation
case.18 6 These cases may indicate that common law malice and the
183. Deaver v. Hinel, 223 Neb. 529, 532, 391 N.W.2d 128, 131 (1986). See also Hoch v.
Prokop, 244 Neb. 443, 507 N.W.2d 626 (1993). In Hoch, the Nebraska Supreme
Court supplied another indication that it will apply constitutional malice stan-
dards in public figure defamation cases. The plaintiff in Hoch was running for a
position on the University of Nebraska Board of Regents. Her opponent in the
race published and distributed a flier criticizing the plaintiff's previous record as
a regent. Id at 628. The plaintiff brought suit alleging thirteen separate in-
stances of libel arising from the flier. The district court granted the defendant's
summary judgment motion on twelve of the thirteen counts, allowing the thir-
teenth to go to trial. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court
committed plain error in not in its failure to recognize that the plaintiffs petition
did not state a cause of action. Id.
The court unequivocally indicated that the plaintiff, a candidate for public of-
fice, was a public figure under current Supreme Court tests. Id at 629. The court
then applied constitutional defamation standards to the situation, defining actual
malice as, "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." AM. Further-
more, the court indicated that it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead falsity in
order to establish a prima facie case of libel, and the plaintiff must also demon-
strate the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements in order to be successful
on the merits. I. The Hoch decision supports the contention that in public fig-
ure cases the Nebraska Supreme Court will apply constitutional standards. How-
ever, Hoch does not indicate that the "truth plus motive" defense is a dead letter
in Nebraska. The court did not address the Nebraska statutes or case law regard-
ing the defense; therefore, at least the defendant in a private figure defamation
case still must be aware of the ramifications of his motives in making an allegedly
defamatory statement.
184. 235 Neb. 754, 457 N.W.2d 803 (1990).
185. Id at 810.
186. 226 Neb. 275, 290, 411 N.W.2d 298, 309 (1987).
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"truth plus motive" defense may have a place in private figure defa-
mation cases, but the absence of a definitive statement by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court leaves the media publisher or broadcaster to
speculate as to which standard will be applied. A general trend of ap-
plication would provide more guidance. However, the paucity of deci-
sions handed down on this subject do not allow for accurate or at least
comfortable predictions.
Several other states have provided firmer direction for libel plain-
tiffs and defendants. These states have determined that common law
malice as embodied in the "truth plus motive" defense is still a useful
indicator of a publisher's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the
publicationlS7 or in the determination of whether to award punitive
damages. 188 However, these same courts have indicated that the ill-
will or a lack of good motives alone cannot defeat the defense of truth.
One court stated:
It is settled that ill will toward the plaintiff or bad motives are not elements of
actual malice and that such evidence is insufficient by itself to support a find-
ing of actual malice.... [E]vidence of ill will or bad motives will support a
finding of actual malice only when combined with other, more substantial evi-
dence of a defendant's bad faith.1 8 9
Not only is Nebraska's continued use of the "truth plus motive"
defense contrary to the general trend of other state courts, it also con-
trary to the defamation reform efforts of the legal community.190
187. See supra note 29.
188. See supra notes 33-36.
189. Herron v. King Broadcasting Co., 746 P.2d 295, 309 (Wash. 1982). See also Batson
v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1213 (Md. 1992); Rose v. Koch, 154 N.W.2d 409, 428
(Minn. 1967); Perez v. Scripps Howard Company, 520 N.E.2d 198, 202-03 (Ohio
1988); Fitzpatrick v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 567 A.2d 684 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989)(stating "[f]ailure to investigate without more, will not support a finding of
actual malice, nor will ill will or a desire to increase profits." Id. at 688); Hack-
worth v. Larson, 165 N.W.2d 705 (S.D. 1969); Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 196 N.W.2d
685, 691 (Wis. 1972)("Here, then, where there was a finding only of 'express mal-
ice,' the verdict does not constitutionally support a finding of 'actual malice' and
for that reason the verdict does not meet New York Times in that regard." Id.)
190. The National Conferee of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws assigned a
drafting committee to review the proposed Uniform Defamation Act of 1989.
Drafts were submitted to the ULC at the 1990 and 1991 meetings. The current
draft discussed in this Note is not the final draft. It was presented for a final
reading in August of 1993. Nonetheless, the current draft represents the policy
choices of the committee and the structure of the proposed act. Robert J.
Hawley, An Overview of the Uniform Defamation Act, 338 PLI/PAT 645 (1992).
The Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern University, a non-profit
organization committed to assessing how communications technologies and cur-
rent public policies on communications affect aspects of American life, also pre-
pared a proposed Model Libel Reform Act. The philosophy behind the Act is
"the conviction that the law of defamation and the First Amendment should not
work at cross-purposes, but should function in harmony to serve the compelling
public interest in the pursuit of the truth." Id. app. A at 683-709, The Report of
the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Foundation.
[Vol. 72:12361272
1993] COMMON LAW MALICE AND DEFAMATION
These reform movements focus on the "proper balance between con-
stitutionally protected guarantees of free expression and the need to
protect citizens from reputational harm."191 Both major reform pro-
posals, the Annenberg Washington Program and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, reject the use of
common law malice as a standard of liability.192
The elements of a defamation action as outlined in each proposal
require the statement to be false in order to be actionable.19 3 Both
proposals make no provision for the "truth plus motive" defense in
any form. Section 18 of the ULC's proposed act entitled "Conditional
Privilege for Statement's Concerning Public Officials and Public
Figures" recognizes the constitutional malice standard. The section
provides,
A person may not be held liable for damages based on a statement about a
public official or a public figure unless the plaintiff proves the statement was:
(1) unrelated to the person's status as a public official or public figure; or
(2) made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth.1 9 4
The comment following this section indicates that the privilege can be
overcome "only upon a showing of actual malice" not upon a showing
of ill-will or improper motives. 195 The Annenberg proposal is more
specific in its exclusion of the "truth plus motive' defense when it
states:
Current law recognizes a wide variety of circumstances in which a conditional
privilege would be deemed abused and forfeited, including . .. ill will or
spite .... This Act, however, recognizes only two grounds for defeating a con-
ditional privilege: excessive publication and publication with knowledge of fal-
sity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.196
The Annenberg proposal rejects common law malice and recognizes
that "[a] communication motivated by spite may nonetheless serve the
purpose advanced by the privilege.... A tainted motive does not of
itself reduces the social value of the communication."197
Neither of these proposals have been adopted. In fact the ULC
proposal has not been completed. However, they do indicate a trend in
legal thinking that will be influential in future defamation law devel-
opments. Nebraska courts should recognize the well developed trends
demonstrated in the case law of other jurisdiction's as well as the de-
veloping reformation of libel law evidenced by the Annenberg and
ULC proposals. This recognition should be followed by a revision of
191. Id. at 657.
192. Id. at 658.
193. Id. at 661, 669. The Annenberg proposal states that all defamation actions must
be based "false defamatory statements of fact."
194. Id. at 669.
195. The actual malice refereed to throughout the proposed Act is constitutional mal-
ice as defined in New York Times. Id.
196. Id. at 674.
197. Id. at 673.
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Nebraska defamation law by the courts in order to bring Nebraska's
law within the national standards and comply with the Supreme
Court rulings beginning with New York Times.
VI. CONCLUSION
The great weight of authority is opposed to Nebraska's "truth plus
motive" defense. The United States Supreme Court, beginning with
New York Times, has consistently indicated that truthful statements
may not be the basis for a defamation action. Grounding its decision
on the constitutional principles of free speech and uninhibited public
debate, the Court in Garrison overruled the "truth plus motive" de-
fense as an unconstitutional restraint of free speech.198 The decisions
following Garrison solidified the Court's denunciation of a "truth plus
motive" defense, sending an unequivocal message that truthful state-
ments were to receive absolute protection.199
If the weight of several Supreme Court decisions is not sufficient to
compel the Nebraska courts to overturn the "truth plus motive" de-
fense, the policy arguments supporting an absolute defense of truth in
public figure cases should move the courts to reconsider the propriety
of maintaining the defense. The inhibition and self-censorship caused
by the "truth plus motive" defense reduce the flow of information to
the public, denying the people information necessary to the governing
process. The free flow of information has long been recognized as vi-
tal to the effective functioning of a democratic form of government,
and any barrier, statutory or judicial, that serves no reasonable public
safety regulatory function, should be removed as an infringement on
the process of self-government.
The weight of several United States Supreme Court decisions, the
compelling policy reasons supporting the repeal, the strong positions
taken by other states, and the developing trends in defamation law all
mitigate in favor of Nebraska abolishing the "truth plus motive" de-
fense. It appears that the weight of authority would be on the side of
defamation defendant challenging the court's interpretation of actual
malice and the "truth plus motive" defense. The resolution of the is-
sue only awaits the proper jurisdictional situation and adversaries.
198. Garrison v. Louisiana, 378 U.S. 64, 74-76 (1964).
199. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
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